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Abstract
Using ideas from automata theory we design a new efficient (deterministic) identity test for the
noncommutative polynomial identity testing problem (first introduced and studied in [RS05, BW05]).
More precisely, given as input a noncommutative circuit C(x1, · · · , xn) computing a polynomial in
F{x1, · · · , xn} of degree d with at most t monomials, where the variables xi are noncommuting, we give
a deterministic polynomial identity test that checks if C ≡ 0 and runs in time polynomial in d, n, |C|,
and t.
The same methods works in a black-box setting: Given a noncommuting black-box polynomial f ∈
F{x1, · · · , xn} of degree d with t monomials we can, in fact, reconstruct the entire polynomial f in time
polynomial in n, d and t. Indeed, we apply this idea to the reconstruction of black-box noncommuting
algebraic branching programs (the ABPs considered by Nisan in [N91] and Raz-Shpilka in [RS05]).
Assuming that the black-box model allows us to query the ABP for the output at any given gate then we
can reconstruct an (equivalent) ABP in deterministic polynomial time.
Finally, we turn to commutative identity testing and explore the complexity of the problem when the
coefficients of the input polynomial come from an arbitrary finite commutative ring with unity whose
elements are uniformly encoded as strings and the ring operations are given by an oracle. We show
that several algorithmic results for polynomial identity testing over fields also hold when the coefficients
come from such finite rings.
1 Introduction
Polynomial identity testing (denoted PIT) over fields is a well studied algorithmic problem: given an arith-
metic circuit C computing a polynomial in F[x1, x2, · · · , xn] over a field F, the problem is to determine
whether the polynomial computed by C is identically zero. The problem is also studied when the input
polynomial f is given only via black-box access. I.e. we can evaluate it at any point in Fn or in F′n for a
field extension F′ of F. When f is given by a circuit the problem is in randomized polynomial time. Even
in the black-box setting, when |F| is suitably larger than deg(f), the problem is in randomized polynomial
time. A major challenge it to obtain deterministic polynomial time algorithms even for restricted versions
of the problem. The results of Impagliazzo and Kabanets [KI03] show that the problem is as hard as prov-
ing superpolynomial circuit lower bounds. Indeed, the problem remains open even for depth-3 arithmetic
circuits with an unbounded Σ gate as output [DS05, KS07].
As shown by Nisan [N91] noncommutative algebraic computation is somewhat easier to prove lower
bounds. Using a rank argument Nisan has shown exponential size lower bounds for noncommutative for-
mulas (and noncommutative algebraic branching programs) that compute the noncommutative permanent or
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determinant polynomials in the ring F{x1, · · · , xn} where xi are noncommuting variables. Thus, it seems
plausible that identity testing in the noncommutative setting ought to be easier too. Indeed, Raz and Shpilka
in [RS05] have shown that that for noncommutative formulas (and algebraic branching programs) there is
a deterministic polynomial time algorithm for polynomial identity testing. However, for noncommutative
circuits the situation is somewhat different. Bogdanov and Wee in [BW05] show using Amitsur-Levitzki’s
theorem that identity testing for polynomial degree noncommutative circuits is in randomized polynomial
time. Basically, the Amitsur-Levitzki theorem allows them to randomly assign elements from a matrix
algebra Mk(F) for the noncommuting variables xi, where 2k exceeds the degree of the circuit.
The main contribution of this paper is the use of ideas from automata theory to design new efficient
(deterministic) polynomial identity tests for noncommutative polynomials. More precisely, given a noncom-
mutative circuit C(x1, · · · , xn) computing a polynomial of degree d with t monomials in F{x1, · · · , xn},
where the variables xi are noncommuting, we give a deterministic polynomial identity test that checks if
C ≡ 0 and runs in time polynomial in d, |C|, n, and t. The main idea in our algorithm is to think of the
noncommuting monomials over the xi as words and to design finite automata that allow us to distinguish
between different words. Then, using the connection between automata, monoids and matrix rings we are
able to deterministically choose a relatively small number of matrix assignments for the noncommuting
variables to decide if C ≡ 0. Thus, we are able to avoid using the Amitsur-Levitzki theorem. Indeed, using
our automata theory method we can easily an alternative proof of (a weaker) version of Amitsur-Levitzki
which is good enough for algorithmic purposes as in [BW05] for example.
Our method actually works in a black-box setting. In fact, given a noncommuting black-box polynomial
f ∈ F{x1, · · · , xn} of degree d with t monomials, which we can evaluate by assigning matrices to xi, we
can reconstruct the entire polynomial f in time polynomial in n, d and t.
Furthermore, we also apply this idea to black-box noncommuting algebraic branching programs. We
extend the result of Raz and Shpilka [RS05] by giving an efficient deterministic reconstruction algorithm for
black-box noncommuting algebraic branching programs (wherein we are allowed to only query the ABP for
input variables set to matrices of polynomial dimension). Our black-box model assumes that we can query
for the output of any gate of the ABP, not just the output gate.
We now motivate and explain the other results in the paper. Recently, in [AM07] we studied PIT (the
usual commuting variables setting) and its connection to the polynomial ideal membership problem. Al-
though ideal membership is EXPSPACE-complete, there is an interesting similarity between the two prob-
lems which is the motivation for the present paper. Suppose I ⊂ F[x1, · · · , xn] is an ideal generated by
polynomials g1, · · · , gr ∈ F[x1, · · · , xk] and f ∈ F[x1, · · · , xn]. We observe that f ∈ I if and only if f is
identically zero in the ring F[x1, · · · , xk]/I[xk+1, · · · , xn]. Thus, ideal membership is easily reducible to
polynomial identity testing when the coefficient ring is F[x1, · · · , xk]/I . Consequently, identity testing for
the coefficient ring F[x1, · · · , xk]/I is EXPSPACE-hard even when the polynomial f is given explicitly as
a linear combination of monomials.
This raises the question about the complexity of PIT for a polynomial ring R[x1, · · · , xn] where R is a
commutative ring with unity. How does the complexity depend on the structure of the ring R? We give a
precise answer to this question in this paper. We show that the algebraic structure of R is not important. It
suffices that the elements of R have polynomial-size encoding, and w.r.t. this encoding the ring operations
can be efficiently performed. This is in contrast to the ring F[x1, · · · , xk]/I: we have double exponential
number of elements of polynomial degree in F[x1, · · · , xk] and the ring operations in F[x1, · · · , xk]/I are
essentially ideal membership questions and hence computationally hard.
More precisely, we study polynomial identity testing for finite commutative rings R, where we assume
that the elements of R are uniformly encoded as strings in {0, 1}m with two special strings encoding 0 and
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1, and the ring operations are carried out by queries to the ring oracle.
2 Noncommutative Polynomial Identity Testing
Recall that an arithmetic circuit C over a field F is defined as follows: C takes as inputs, a set of indeter-
minates (either commuting or noncommuting) and elements from F as scalars. If f, g are the inputs of an
addition gate, then the output will be f + g. Similarly for a multiplication gate the output will be fg. For
noncommuting variables the circuit respect the order of multiplication. An arithmetic circuit is a formula if
the fan-out of every gate is at most one.
Noncommutative identity testing was studied by Raz and Shpilka in [RS05] and Bogdanov and Wee in
[BW05]. In the Bogdanov-Wee paper, they considered a polynomial f of small degree over F{x1, · · · , xn},
for a field F, given by an arithmetic circuit. They were able to give a randomized polynomial time algorithm
for the identity testing of f . The key feature of their algorithm was a reduction from noncommutative identity
testing to commutative identity testing which is based on a classic theorem of Amitsur and Levitzki [AL50]
about minimal identities for algebras.
Raz and Shpilka [RS05] give a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for noncommutative formula
identity testing by first converting a homogeneous formula into a noncommutative algebraic branching pro-
gram (ABP), as done in [N91].
In this section we study the noncommutative polynomial identity testing problem. Using simple ideas
from automata theory, we design a new deterministic identity test that runs in polynomial time if the input
circuit is sparse and of small degree. Our algorithm works with only black-box access to the noncommuting
polynomial, and we can even efficiently reconstruct the polynomial.
We will first describe the algorithm to test if a sparse polynomial of polynomial degree over noncom-
muting variables is identically zero. Then we give an algorithm that reconstructs this sparse polynomial.
Though the latter result subsumes the former, for clarity of exposition, we describe both. Furthermore, we
note that we can assume that the polynomial is given as an arithmetic circuit over a field F.
In the case of commuting variables, [OT88] gives an interpolation algorithm that computes the given
sparse polynomial, and thus can be used for identity testing. It is not clear how to generalize this algorithm
to the noncommutative setting. Our identity testing algorithm evaluates the given polynomial at specific,
well-chosen points in a matrix algebra (of polynomial dimension over the base field), such that any non-zero
sparse polynomial is guaranteed to evaluate to a non-zero matrix at one of these points. The reconstruction
algorithm uses the above identity testing algorithm as a subroutine in a prefix-based search to find all the
monomials and their coefficients.
We now describe the identity testing algorithm informally. Our idea is to view each monomial as a
short binary string. A sparse polynomial, hence, is given by a polynomial number of such strings (and the
coefficients of the corresponding monomials). The algorithm proceeds in two steps; in the first step, we
construct a small set of finite automata such that, given any small collection of short binary strings, at least
one automaton from the set accepts exactly one string from this collection; in the second step, for each of the
automata constructed, we construct a tuple of points over a matrix algebra over F such that the evaluation of
any monomial at the tuple ‘mimics’ the run of the corresponding string on the automaton. Now, given any
non-zero polynomial f of small degree with few terms, we are guaranteed to have constructed an automaton
A ‘isolating’ a string from the collection of strings corresponding to monomials in f . We then show that
evaluating f over the tuple corresponding to A gives us a non-zero output: hence, we can conclude f is
non-zero. We now describe both algorithms formally.
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2.1 Preliminaries
We first recall some standard automata theory notation (see, for example, [HU78]). Fix a finite automaton
A = (Q, δ, q0, qf ) which takes as input strings in {0, 1}∗. Q is the set of states of A, δ : Q × {0, 1} → Q
is the transition function, and q0 and qf are the initial and final states respectively (throughout, we only
consider automata with unique accepting states). For each letter b ∈ {0, 1}, let δb : Q→ Q be the function
defined by: δb(q) = δ(q, b). These functions generate a submonoid of the monoid of all functions from Q
to Q. This is the transition monoid of the automaton A and is well-studied in automata theory: for example,
see [Str94, page 55]. We now define the 0-1 matrix Mb ∈ F|Q|×|Q| as follows:
Mb(q, q
′) =
{
1 if δb(q) = q′,
0 otherwise.
The matrix Mb is simply the adjacency matrix of the graph of the function δb. As the entries of Mb are
only zeros and ones, we can consider Mb to be a matrix over any field F.
Furthermore, for any w = w1w2 · · ·wk ∈ {0, 1}∗ we define the matrix Mw to be the matrix product
Mw1Mw2 · · ·Mwk . If w is the empty string, define Mw to be the identity matrix of dimension |Q| × |Q|.
For a string w, let δw denote the natural extension of the transition function to w; if w is the empty string,
δw is simply the identity function. It is easy to check that:
Mw(q, q
′) =
{
1 if δw(q) = q′,
0 otherwise. (1)
Thus, Mw is also a matrix of zeros and ones for any string w. Also, Mw(q0, qf ) = 1 if and only if w is
accepted by the automaton A.
2.2 The output of a circuit on an automaton
Now, we consider the ring F{x1, · · · , xn} of polynomials with noncommuting variables x1, · · · , xn over a
field F. Let C be a noncommutative arithmetic circuit computing a polynomial f ∈ F{x1, · · · , xn}. Let
d be an upper bound on the degree of f . We can consider monomials over the noncommuting variables
x1, · · · , xn as strings over an alphabet of size n. For our construction in Section 2.3, it is convenient
to encode the variables xi in the alphabet {0, 1}. We do this by encoding the variable xi by the string
vi = 01
i0, which is basically a unary encoding with delimiters. Clearly, each monomial over the xi’s of
degree at most d maps uniquely to a binary string of length at most d(n+ 2).
Let A = (Q, δ, q0, qf ) be a finite automaton over the alphabet {0, 1}. With respect to automaton A we
have matrices Mvi ∈ F|Q|×|Q| as defined in Section 2.1, where each vi is the binary string that encodes
xi. We are interested in the output matrix obtained when the inputs xi to the circuit C are replaced by the
matrices Mvi . This output matrix is defined in the obvious way: the inputs are |Q|× |Q| matrices and we do
matrix addition and matrix multiplication at each addition (resp. multiplication) of the circuit C . We define
the output of C on the automaton A to be this output matrix Mout. Clearly, given circuit C and automaton
A, the matrix Mout can be computed in time poly(|C|, |A|, n).
We observe the following property: the matrix output Mout of C on A is determined completely by the
polynomial f computed by C; the structure of the circuit C is otherwise irrelevant. This is important for us,
since we are only interested in f . In particular, the output is always 0 when f ≡ 0.
More specifically, consider what happens when C computes a polynomial with a single term, say
f(x1, · · · , xn) = cxj1 · · · xjk , with a non-zero coefficient c ∈ F. In this case, the output matrix Mout
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is clearly the matrix cMvj1 · · ·Mvjk = cMw, where w = vj1 · · · vjk is the binary string representing the
monomial xj1 · · · xjk . Thus, by Equation 1 above, we see that the entry Mout(q0, qf ) is 0 when A rejects
w, and c when A accepts w. In general, suppose C computes a polynomial f =
∑t
i=1 cimi with t nonzero
terms, where ci ∈ F \ {0} and mi =
∏di
j=1 xij , where di ≤ d. Let wi = vi1 · · · vidi denote the binary string
representing monomial mi. Finally, let SfA = {i ∈ {1, · · · , t} | A accepts wi}.
Theorem 2.1 Given any arithmetic circuit C computing polynomial f ∈ F{x1, · · · , xn} and any finite
automaton A = (Q, δ, q0, qf ), then the output Mout of C on A is such that Mout(q0, qf ) =
∑
i∈SfA
ci.
Proof. The proof is an easy consequence of the definitions and the properties of the matrices Mw stated
in Section 2.1. Note that Mout = f(Mv1 , · · · ,Mvn). But f(Mv1 , · · · ,Mvn) =
∑s
i=1 ciMwi , where
wi = vi1 · · · vidi is the binary string representing monomial mi. By Equation 1, we know that Mwi(q0, qf )
is 1 if wi is accepted by A, and 0 otherwise. Adding up, we obtain the result.
We now explain the role of the automaton A in testing if the polynomial f computed by C is identically
zero or not. Our basic idea is to try and design an automaton A that accepts exactly one word from among all
the words that correspond to the non-zero terms in f . This would ensure that Mout(q0, qf ) is the non-zero
coefficient of the monomial filtered out. More precisely, we will use the above theorem primarily in the
following form, which we state as a corollary.
Corollary 2.2 Given any arithmetic circuit C computing polynomial f ∈ F{x1, · · · , xn} and any finite
automaton A = (Q, δ, q0, qf ), then the output Mout of C on A satisfies:
(1) If A rejects every string corresponding to a monomial in f , then Mout(q0, qf ) = 0.
(2) If A accepts exactly one string corresponding to a monomial in f , then Mout(q0, qf ) is the nonzero
coefficient of that monomial in f .
Moreover, Mout can be computed in time poly(|C|, |A|, n).
Proof. Both points (1) and (2) are immediate consequences of the above theorem. The complexity of
computing Mout easily follows from its definition.
Another interesting corollary to the above theorem is the following.
Corollary 2.3 Given any arithmetic circuit C over F{x1, · · · , xn}, and any monomial m of degree dm, we
can compute the coefficient of m in C in time poly(|C|, dm, n).
Proof. Apply Corollary 2.2 with A being any standard automaton that accepts the string corresponding to
monomial m and rejects every other string. Clearly, A can be chosen so that A has a unique accepting state
and |A| = O(ndm).
Remark 2.4 Observe that Corollary 2.3 is highly unlikely to hold in the commutative setting F[x1, · · · , xn].
For, in the commutative case, computing the coefficient of the monomial x1 · · · xn in even an arbitrary
product of linear forms Πiℓi is at least as hard as the permanent problem over F, which is #P-complete
when F = Q.
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Remark 2.5 Corollary 2.2 can also be used to give an independent proof of a weaker form of the result of
Amitsur and Levitzki that is stated in Lemma A.4. In particular, it is easy to see that the algebra Md(F) of
d× d matrices over the field F does not satisfy any nontrivial identity of degree < d. To prove this, we will
consider noncommuting monomials as strings directly over the n letter alphabet {x1, · · · , xn}. Suppose
f =
∑t
i=1 cimi ∈ F{x1, · · · , xn} is a nonzero polynomial of degree < d. Clearly, we can construct an
automaton B over the alphabet {x1, · · · , xn} that accepts exactly one string, namely one nonzero monomial,
say mi0 , of f and rejects all the other strings over {x1, · · · , xn}. Also, B can be constructed with at most d
states. Now, consider the output Mout of any circuit computing f on B. By Corollary 2.2 the output matrix
is non-zero, and this proves the result.
2.3 Construction of finite automata
We begin with a useful definition.
Definition 2.6 Let W be a finite set of binary strings and A be a finite family of finite automata over the
binary alphabet {0, 1}.
• We say that A is isolating for W if there exists a string w ∈W and an automaton A ∈ A such that A
accepts w and rejects all w′ ∈W \ {w}.
• We say that A is an (m, s)-isolating family if for every subset W = {w1, · · · , ws} of s many binary
strings, each of length at most m, there is a A ∈ A such that A is isolating for W .
Fix parameters m, s ∈ N. Our first aim is to construct an (m, s) isolating family of automata A, where
both |A| and the size of each automaton in A is polynomially bounded in size. Then, combined with
Corollary 2.2 we will be able to obtain deterministic identity testing and interpolation algorithms in the
sequel.
Recall that we only deal with finite automata that have unique accepting states. In what follows, for a
string w ∈ {0, 1}∗, we denote by nw the positive integer represented by the binary numeral 1w. For each
prime p and each integer i ∈ {0, · · · , p− 1}, we can easily construct an automaton Ap,i that accepts exactly
those w such that nw ≡ i (mod p). Moreover, Ap,i can be constructed so as to have p states and exactly one
final state.
Our collection of automata A is just the set of Ap,i where p runs over the first few polynomially many
primes, and i ∈ {0, · · · , p − 1}. Formally, let N denote (m + 2)
(s
2
)
+ 1; A is the collection of Ap,i,
where p runs over the first N primes and i ∈ {0, · · · , p − 1}. Notice that, by the prime number theorem,
all the primes chosen above are bounded in value by N2, which is clearly polynomial in m and s. Hence,
|A| = poly(m, s), and each A ∈ A is bounded in size by poly(m, s). In the following lemma we show that
A is an (m, s)-isolating automata family.
Lemma 2.7 The family of finite automata A defined as above is an (m, s)-isolating automata family.
Proof. Consider any set of s binary strings W of length at most m each. By the construction ofA, Ap,i ∈ A
isolates W if and only if p does not divide nwj−nwk for some j and all k 6= j, and nwj ≡ i (mod p). Clearly,
if p satisfies the first of these conditions, i can easily be chosen so that the second condition is satisfied. We
will show that there is some prime among the first N primes that does not divide P =
∏
j 6=k(nwj − nwk).
This easily follows from the fact that the number of distinct prime divisors of P is at most log |P |, which is
clearly bounded by (m+ 2)
(s
2
)
= N − 1. This concludes the proof.
We note that the above (m, s)-isolating family A can clearly be constructed in time poly(m, s).
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2.4 The identity testing algorithm
We now describe the identity testing algorithm. Let C be the input circuit computing a polynomial f over
F{x1, · · · , xn}. Let t be an upper bound on the number of monomials in f , and d be an upper bound on the
degree of f . As in Section 2.2, we represent monomials over x1, · · · , xn as binary strings. Every monomial
in f is represented by a string of length at most d(n + 2).
Our algorithm proceeds as follows: Using the construction of Section 2.3, we compute a family A of
automata such that A is isolating for any set W with at most t strings of length at most d(n + 2) each. For
each A ∈ A, the algorithm computes the output Mout of C on A. If Mout 6= 0 for any A, then the algorithm
concludes that the polynomial computed by the input circuit is not identically zero; otherwise, the algorithm
declares that the polynomial is identically zero.
The correctness of the above algorithm is almost immediate from Corollary 2.2. If the polynomial is
identically zero, it is easy to see that the algorithm outputs the correct answer. If the polynomial is nonzero,
then by the construction of A, we know that there exists A ∈ A such that A accepts precisely one of the
strings corresponding to the monomials in f . Then, by Corollary 2.2, the output of C on A is nonzero.
Hence, the algorithm correctly deduces that the polynomial computed is not identically zero.
As for the running time of the algorithm, it is easy to see that the family of automata A can be constructed
in time poly(d, n, t). Also, the matrices Mvi for each A (all of which are of size poly(d, n, t)) can be
constructed in polynomial time. Hence, the entire algorithm runs in time poly(|C|, d, n, t). We have proved
the following theorem:
Theorem 2.8 Given any arithmetic circuit C with the promise that C computes a polynomial f ∈
F{x1, · · · , xn} of degree d with at most t monomials, we can check, in time poly(|C|, d, n, t), if f is identi-
cally zero. In particular, if f is sparse and of polynomial degree, then we have a deterministic polynomial
time algorithm.
In the case of arbitrary noncommutative arithmetic circuits, [BW05] gives a randomized exponential
time algorithm for the identity testing problem. Their algorithm is based on the Amitsur-Levitzki theorem,
which forces the identity test to randomly assign exponential size matrices for the noncommuting variables
since the circuit could compute an exponential degree polynomial. However, notice that Theorem 2.8 gives
a deterministic exponential-time algorithm under the additional restriction that the input circuit computes
a polynomial with at most exponentially many monomials. In general, a polynomial of exponential degree
can have a double exponential number of terms.
2.5 Interpolation of noncommutative polynomials
We now describe an algorithm that efficiently computes the noncommutative polynomial given by the input
circuit. LetC, f, t and d be as in Section 2.4. LetW denote the set of all strings corresponding to monomials
with non-zero coefficients in f . For all binary strings w, let Aw denote any standard automaton that accepts
w and rejects all other strings. For any automaton A and string w, we let [A]w denote the automaton that
accepts those strings that are accepted byA and in addition, contain w as a prefix. For a set of finite automata
A, let [A]w denote the set {[A]w | A ∈ A}.
We now describe a subroutine Test that takes as input an arithmetic circuitC and a set of finite automata
A and returns a field element α ∈ F. The subroutine Test will have the following properties:
(P1) If A is isolating for W , the set of strings corresponding to monomials in f , then α 6= 0.
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(P2) In the special case when |A| = 1, and the above holds, then α is in fact the coefficient of the isolated
monomial.
(P3) If no A ∈ A accepts any string in W , then α = 0.
We now give the easy description of Test(C,A):
For each A ∈ A, the subroutine Test computes the output matrix MAout of C on A. If there is an
A ∈ A such that MAout(qA0 , qAf ) 6= 0, then for the first such automaton A ∈ A, Test returns the scalar
α = MAout(q
A
0 , q
A
f ). Here, notice that qA0 , qAf denote the initial and final states of the automaton A. If there
is no such automaton A ∈ A is found, then the subroutine returns the scalar 0.
It follows directly from Corollary 2.2 that Test has Properties (P1)-(P3). Furthermore, clearly Test
runs in time poly(|C|, ||A||), where ||A|| denotes the sum of the sizes of the automata in A.
Let f ∈ F{x1, · · · , xn} denote the noncommuting polynomial computed by the input circuit C . We
now describe a recursive prefix-search based algorithm Interpolate that takes as input the circuit C and
a binary string u, and computes all those monomials of f (along with their coefficients) which contain u
as a prefix when encoded as strings using our encoding xi 7→ vi = 01i0. Clearly, in order to obtain all
monomials of f with their coefficients, it suffices to run this algorithm with u = ǫ, the empty string.
In what follows, let A0 denote the (m, s)-isolating automata family {Ap,i} as constructed in Section
2.3 with parameters m = d(n + 2) and s = t. As explained in Section 2.3, we can compute A0 in time
poly(d, n, t).
Suppose f is the polynomial computed by the circuit C . We now describe the algorithm
Interpolate(C,u) formally (Algorithm 1).
The correctness of this algorithm is clear from the correctness of the Test subroutine and Lemma 2.7.
To bound the running time, note that the algorithm never calls Interpolate on a string u unless u is the
prefix of some string corresponding to a monomial. Hence, the algorithm invokes Interpolate for at most
O(td(n + 2)) many prefixes u. Since ||[A0]u0|| and |Au| are both bounded by poly(d, n, t) for all prefixes
u, it follows that the running time of the algorithm is poly(|C|, d, n, t). We summarize this discussion in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.9 Given any arithmetic circuit C computing a polynomial f ∈ F{x1, · · · , xn} of degree at
most d and with at most t monomials, we can compute all the monomials of f , and their coefficients, in time
poly(|C|, d, n, t). In particular, if C computes a sparse polynomial f of polynomial degree, then f can be
reconstructed in polynomial time.
3 Interpolation of Algebraic Branching Programs over noncommuting vari-
ables
In this section, we study the interpolation problem for black-box Algebraic Branching Programs (ABP)
computing a polynomial in the noncommutative ring F{x1, · · · , xn}. We are given as input an ABP (defined
below) P in the black-box setting, and our task is to output an ABP P ′ that computes the same polynomial
as P . To make the task feasible in the black-box setting, we assume that we are allowed to evaluate P at any
of its intermediate gates.
We first observe that all the results in Section 2 hold under the assumption that the input polynomial f
is allowed only black-box access. In the noncommutative setting, we shall assume that the black-box access
allows the polynomial to be evaluated for input values from an arbitrary matrix algebra over the base field
F. It is implicit here that the cost of evaluation is polynomial in the dimension of the matrices. Note that
8
Algorithm 1 The Interpolation algorithm
1: procedure Interpolate(C ,u)
2: α,α′, α′′ ← 0.
3: α← Test(C, {Au}) ⊲ Au is the standard automaton that accepts only u
4: if α = 0 then
5: Break. ⊲ u can not corresponds to a monomial of f
6: else
7: Output (u, α). ⊲ u is the binary encoding of a monomial of f with coefficient α
8: end if
Now the algorithm find all monomials (along with their coefficient)
containing u0 or u1 as prefix in the binary encoding.
9: if |u| = d(n+ 2) then
10: Stop.
11: else
12: α′ ←Test(C, [A0]u0), α′′ ←Test(C, [A0]u1).
13: end if
14: if α′ 6= 0 then
15: Interpolate(C, u0). ⊲ There is some monomial in C extending u0
16: end if
17: if α′′ 6= 0 then
18: Interpolate(C, u1). ⊲ There is some monomial in C extending u1
19: end if
20: end procedure
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this is a reasonable noncommutative black-box model, because if we can evaluate f only over F or any
commutative extension of F, then we cannot distinguish the non-commutative polynomial represented by f
from the corresponding commutative polynomial. We state the black-box version of our results below.
Theorem 3.1 (Similar to Theorem 2.1) Given black-box access to any polynomial f = ∑ti=1 cimi ∈
F{x1, · · · , xn} and any finite automaton A = (Q, δ, q0, qf ), then the output Mout of f on A is such that
Mout(q0, qf ) =
∑
i∈SfA
ci, where SfA = {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ t and A accepts the string wi corresponding to mi}
Here the output of polynomial f on A is defined analogously to the output of a circuit on A in Section 2.2.
Corollary 3.2 (Similar to Corollary 2.3) Given black-box access to a polynomial f in F{x1, · · · , xn}, and
any monomial m of degree dm, we can compute the coefficient of m in f in time poly(dm, n).
Finally we have,
Theorem 3.3 (Similar to Theorem 2.9) Given black-box access to a polynomial f in F{x1, · · · , xn} of
degree at most d and with at most t monomials, we can compute all the monomials of f , and their coeffi-
cients, in time poly(d, n, t). In particular, if f is a sparse polynomial of polynomial degree, then it can be
reconstructed in polynomial time.
Our interpolation algorithm for noncommutative ABPs is motivated by Raz and Shpilka’s [RS05] algo-
rithm for identity testing of ABPs over noncommuting variables. Our algorithm interpolates the given ABP
layer by layer using ideas developed in Section 2 (principally Corollary 3.2).
Definition 3.4 [N91, RS05] An Algebraic Branching Program (ABP) is a directed acyclic graph with one
vertex of in-degree zero, called the source, and a vertex of out-degree zero, called the sink. The vertices of
the graph are partitioned into levels numbered 0, 1, · · · , d. Edges may only go from level i to level i+ 1 for
i ∈ {0, · · · , d − 1}. The source is the only vertex at level 0 and the sink is the only vertex at level d. Each
edge is labeled with a homogeneous linear form in the input variables. The size of the ABP is the number of
vertices.
Notice that an ABP with no edge between two vertices u and v on levels i and i + 1 is equivalent to
an ABP with an edge from u to v labeled with the zero linear form. Thus, without loss of generality, we
assume that in the given ABP there is an edge between every pair of vertices on adjacent levels.
As mentioned before, we will assume black-box access to the input ABP P where we can evaluate the
polynomial computed by P at any of its gates over arbitrary matrix rings over F. In order to specify the gate
at which we want the output, we index the gates of P with a layer number and a gate number (in the layer).
Based on [RS05], we now define a Raz-Shpilka basis for the level i of the ABP. Let the number of
nodes at the i-th level be Gi and let {p1, p2, · · · , pGi} be the polynomials computed at the nodes. We
will identify this set of polynomials with the Gi × ni matrix Mi where the columns of Mi are indexed by
ni different monomials of degree i, and the rows are indexed by the polynomials pj . The entries of the
matrix Mi are the corresponding polynomial coefficients. A Raz Shpilka basis is a set of at most Gi linearly
independent column vectors of Mi that generates the entire column space. Notice that every vector in the
basis is identified by a monomial.
In the algorithm we need to compute a Raz-Shpilka basis at every level of the ABP. Notice that at the
level 0 it is trivial to compute such a basis. Inductively assume we can compute such a basis at the level i.
Denote the basis by Bi = {v1, v2, · · · , vki} where vj ∈ FGi , and ki ≤ Gi. Assume that the elements of
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this basis corresponds to the monomials {m1,m2, · · · ,mki}. We compute a Raz Shpilka basis at the level
i + 1 by computing the column vectors corresponding to the set of monomials {mjxs}j∈[ki],s∈[n] in Mi+1
and then extracting the linear independent vectors out of them. Computing these column vectors requires
the computation of the coefficients of these monomials, which can be done in polynomial time using the
Corollary 3.2. Notice that we also know the monomials that the elements of this basis correspond to.
We now describe the interpolation algorithm formally. As mentioned before, we will construct the output
ABP P ′ layer by layer such that every gate of P ′ computes the same polynomial as the corresponding gate
in P . Clearly, this task is trivial at level 0.
Assume that we have completed the construction up to level i < d. We now construct level i+ 1. This
only involves computation of the linear forms between level i and level i + 1. Hence, there are ki ≤ Gi
vectors in the Raz-Shpilka basis at the ith level. Let the monomials corresponding to these vectors be
B = {m1, · · · ,mki}. Fix any gate u at level i+ 1 in P , and let pu be the polynomial compute at this gate
in P . Clearly,
pu =
Gi∑
j=1
pjℓj
where pj is the polynomial computed at the jth gate at level i, and ℓj is the linear form labeling the edge
between the jth gate at level i and u.
We have,
pu =
Gi∑
j=1
pjℓj
=
Gi∑
j=1

 ∑
m:|m|=i
c(j)m m


(
n∑
s=1
a(j)s xs
)
=
∑
m:|m|=i,s
mxs

 Gi∑
j=1
c(j)m a
(j)
s


=
∑
m:|m|=i,s
mxs〈cm, as〉
where cm and as denote the vectors of field elements (c(j)m )j and (a(j)s )j respectively. Note that as denotes
a vector of unknowns that we need to compute. Each monomial mxs in the above equation gives us a linear
constraint on as. However, this system of constraints is exponential in size. To obtain a feasible solution for
{as}s∈[n], we observe that it is sufficient to satisfy the constraints corresponding only to monomials mxs
where m ∈ B. All other constraints are simply linear combinations of these and are thus automatically
satisfied by any solution to these.
Now, for m ∈ B and s ∈ {1, · · · , n}, we compute the coefficients of mxs in pu and those of m in each
of the pi’s using the algorithm of Corollary 3.2. Hence, we have all the linear constraints we need to solve
for {as}s∈[n]. Firstly, note that such a solution exists, since the linear forms in the black box ABP P give
us such a solution. Moreover, any solution to this system of linear equations generates the same polynomial
pu at gate u. Hence, we can use any solution to this system of linear equations as our linear forms. We
perform this computation for all gates u at the i+ 1st level. The final step in the iteration is to compute the
Raz-Shpilka basis for the level i+ 1.
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We can use induction on the level numbers to argue correctness of the algorithm. From the input black-
box ABP P , for each level k, let Pjk, 1 ≤ j ≤ Gk denote the algebraic branching programs computed by
P with output gate as gate j in level k. Assume, as induction hypothesis, that the algorithm has computed
linear forms for all levels upto level i and, furthermore, that the algorithm has a correct Raz-Shpilka basis
for all levels upto level i. This gives us a reconstructed ABP P ′ upto level i with the property, for 1 ≤ k ≤ i,
each ABP P ′jk, 1 ≤ j ≤ Gk computes the same polynomials as the corresponding Pjk, 1 ≤ j ≤ Gk, where
P ′jk is obtained from P ′ by designating gate j at level k as output gate. Under this induction hypothesis,
it is clear that our interpolation algorithm will compute a correct set of linear forms between levels i and
i + 1. Consequently, the algorithm will correctly reconstruct an ABP P ′ upto level i + 1 along with a
corresponding Raz-Shpilka basis for that level.
We can now summarize the result in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5 Let P be an ABP of size s and depth d over F{x1, x2, · · · , xn} given by black-box access that
allows evaluation of any gate of P for inputs xi chosen from a matrix algebra Mk(F) for a polynomially
bounded value of k. Then in deterministic time poly(d, s, n), we can compute an ABP P ′ such that P ′
evaluates to the same polynomial as P .
4 Noncommutative identity testing and circuit lower bounds
In Section 2 we gave a new deterministic identity test for noncommuting polynomials which runs in poly-
nomial time for sparse polynomials of polynomially bounded degree.
However, the real problem of interest is identity testing for polynomials given by small degree non-
commutative circuits for which Bogdanov and Wee [BW05] give an efficient randomized test. When the
noncommutative circuit is a formula, Raz and Shpilka [RS05] have shown that the problem is in determin-
istic polynomial time. Their method uses ideas from Nisan’s lower bound technique for noncommutative
formulae [N91].
How hard would it be to show that noncommutative PIT is in deterministic polynomial time for circuits
of polynomial degree? In the commutative case, Impagliazzo and Kabanets [KI03] have shown that deran-
domizing PIT implies circuit lower bounds. It implies that either NEXP 6⊆ P/poly or the integer Permanent
does not have polynomial-size arithmetic circuits.
We observe that this result also holds in the noncommutative setting. I.e., if noncommutative PIT has
a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm then either NEXP 6⊆ P/poly or the noncommutative Permanent
function does not have polynomial-size noncommutative circuits.
As noted, in some cases noncommutative circuit lower bounds are easier to prove than for commutative
circuits. Nisan [N91] has shown exponential-size lower bounds for noncommutative formula size and further
results are known for pure noncommutative circuits [N91, RS05]. However, proving superpolynomial size
lower bounds for general noncommutative circuits computing the Permanent has remained an open problem.
The noncommutative Permanent function Perm(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ R{x1, · · · , xn} is defined as
Perm(x1, · · · , xn) =
∑
σ∈Sn
n∏
i=1
xi,σ(i),
where the coefficient ringR is any commutative ring with unity. Specifically, for the next theorem we choose
R = Q.
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Theorem 4.1 If PIT for noncommutative circuits of polynomial degree C(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Q{x1, · · · , xn}
is in deterministic polynomial-time then either NEXP 6⊆ P/poly or the noncommutative Permanent function
does not have polynomial-size noncommutative circuits.
Proof. Suppose NEXP ⊆ P/poly. Then, by the main result of [IKW02] we have NEXP = MA. Furthermore,
by Toda’s theorem MA ⊆ PPermZ , where the oracle computes the integer permanent. Now, assuming PIT
for noncommutative circuits of polynomial degree is in deterministic polynomial-time we will show that the
(noncommutative) Permanent function does not have polynomial-size noncommutative circuits. Suppose to
the contrary that it does have polynomial-size noncommutative circuits. Clearly, we can use it to compute the
integer permanent as well. Furthermore, as in [KI03] we notice that the noncommutative n × n Permanent
is also uniquely characterized by the identities p1(x) ≡ x and pi(X) =
∑i
j=1 x1jpi−1(Xj) for 1 < i ≤ n,
where X is a matrix of i2 noncommuting variables and Xj is its j-th minor w.r.t. the first row. I.e. if arbitrary
polynomials pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n satisfies these n identities over noncommuting variables xij, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n if and
only if pi computes the i × i permanent of noncommuting variables. The rest of the proof is exactly as in
Impagliazzo-Kabanets [KI03]. We can easily describe an NP machine to simulate a PPermZ computation.
The NP machine guesses a polynomial-size noncommutative circuit for Perm on m ×m matrices, where
m is a polynomial bound on the matrix size of the queries made. Then the NP verifies that the circuit
computes the permanent by checking the m noncommutative identities it must satisfy. This can be done in
deterministic polynomial time by assumption. Finally, the NP machines uses the circuit to answer all the
integer permanent queries. Putting it together, we get NEXP = NP which contradicts the nondeterministic
time hierarchy theorem.
5 Schwartz-Zippel lemma over finite rings
In this section we give a generalization of Schwartz-Zippel Lemma to finite commutative rings and apply it
for identity testing of black-box polynomials in R[x1, · · · , xn], where R is a finite commutative ring with
unity whose elements are uniformly encoded by strings from {0, 1}m with a special string e denote unity,
and the ring operations are performed by a ring oracle.
We recall some facts about finite commutative rings [B74, AM69]. A commutative ring R with unity
is a local ring if R has a unique maximal ideal M . An element r ∈ R is nilpotent if rn = 0 for some
positive integer n. An element r ∈ R is a unit if it is invertible. I.e. rr′ = 1 for some element r′ ∈ R. Any
element of a finite local ring is either a nilpotent or a unit. An ideal I is a prime ideal of R if ab ∈ I implies
either a ∈ I or b ∈ I . For finite commutative rings, prime ideals and maximal ideals coincide. These facts
considerably simplify the study of finite commutative rings (in contrast to infinite rings).
The radical of a finite ring R denoted by Rad(R) is defined as the set of all nilpotent elements, i.e
Rad(R) = {r ∈ R | ∃n > 0 s.t rn = 0}
The radical Rad(R) is an ideal of R, and it is the unique maximum ideal if R is a local ring. Let m
denote the least positive integer such that for every nilpotent r ∈ R, rm = 0, i.e (Rad(R))m = 0. Let R be
any finite commutative ring with unity and {P1, P2, · · · , Pℓ} by the set of all maximal ideals of R. Let Ri
denote the quotient ring R/Pmi for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. Then, it is easy to see that each Ri is a local ring and Pi/Pmi
is the unique maximal ideal in Ri. We recall the following structure theorem for finite commutative rings.
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Theorem 5.1 ([B74], Theorem VI.2, page 95) Let R be a finite commutative ring. Then R decomposes
(up to order of summands) uniquely as a direct sum of local rings. More precisely
R ∼= R1 ⊕R2 ⊕ · · · ⊕Rℓ,
via the map φ(r) = (r + Pm1 , r + Pm2 , · · · , r + Pmℓ ), where Ri = R/Pmi and Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ are all the
maximal ideals of R.
It is easy to see that φ is a homomorphism with trivial kernel. The isomorphism φ naturally ex-
tends to the polynomial ring R[x1, x2, · · · , xn], and gives the isomorphism φˆ : R[x1, x2, · · · , xn] →
⊕ℓi=1Ri[x1, x2, · · · , xn].
5.1 The Schwartz-Zippel lemma
We observe the following easy fact about zeros of a univariate polynomial over a ring.
Proposition 5.2 Let R be an arbitrary commutative ring containing an integral domain D. If f ∈ R[x] is
a nonzero polynomial of degree d then f(a) = 0 for at most d distinct values of a ∈ D.
Proof. Suppose a1, a2, · · · , ad+1 ∈ D are distinct points such that f(ai) = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ d + 1. Then
we can write f(x) = (x − a1)q(x) for q(x) ∈ R[x]. Now, dividing q(x) by x − a2 yields q(x) =
(x − a2)q
′(x) + q(a2), for some q′(x) ∈ R[x]. Thus, f(x) = (x − a1)(x − a2)q′(x) + (x − a1)q(a2).
Putting x = a2 in this equation gives (a2 − a1)q(a2) = 0. But a2 − a1 is a nonzero element in D and
is hence invertible. Therefore, q(a2) = 0. Consequently, f(x) = (x − a1)(x − a2)q′(x). Applying
this argument successively for the other ai finally yields f(x) = g(x)
∏d+1
i=1 (x − ai) for some nonzero
polynomial g(x) ∈ R[x]. Since
∏d+1
i=1 (x− ai) is a monic polynomial, this forces deg(f) ≥ d+ 1 which is
a contradiction.
Consider a polynomial f ∈ R[x1, · · · , xn]. Let R′ denote the ring R[x1, · · · , xn−1]. Then we can con-
sider f as a univariate polynomial in R′[xn] and apply Lemma 5.2, since R′ contains the integral domain D
that R contains. Now, by an easy induction argument on the number of variables as in [TZ06, Lemma D.3],
we can derive the following analog of the Schwartz-Zippel test for arbitrary commutative rings containing
large enough integral domains.
Lemma 5.3 Let R be an arbitrary commutative ring containing an integral domain D. Let g ∈
R[x1, x2, · · · , xn] be any polynomial of degree at most d. If g 6≡ 0, then for any finite subset A of D
we have
Proba1∈A,··· ,an∈A[g(a1, a2, · · · , an) = 0] ≤
nd
|A|
.
In general Lemma 5.3 is not applicable, because the given ring may not contain a large integral domain.
We explain how to get around this problem in the case of finite local commutative rings. Because of the
structure theorem, it suffices to consider local rings.
Let R be a finite local ring with unity given by a ring oracle. Suppose the characteristic of R is pα for a
prime p. If the elements of R are encoded in {0, 1}m then 2m upper bounds the size of R. Let M > 2m, to
be fixed later in the analysis. Let U = {ce | 0 ≤ c ≤M}, where e denotes the unity ofR. We will argue that,
for a suitable M , if we sample ce uniformly from U then (c mod p) e is almost uniformly distributed in Zpe.
Pick x uniformly at random from ZM and output xe. Let a ∈ Zp and P = Prob[x ≡ a (mod p)]. The x for
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which x ≡ a (mod p) are a, a+p, · · · , a+p⌊M−ap ⌋. LetM
′ = ⌊M−ap ⌋. Then P = M
′+1/M ≤ 1p(1+
2m
M ).
Clearly, P ≥ 1p(1−
2m
M ). For a given ǫ > 0, choose M = 2
m+1/ǫ. Then 1−ǫ/2p ≤ P ≤
1+ǫ/2
p . So (xmod p)e
is ǫ2 -uniformly distributed in Zpe.
Lemma 5.4 Let R be a finite local commutative ring with unity and of characteristic pα for a prime p. The
elements of R are encoded using binary strings of length m. Let g ∈ R[x1, x2, · · · , xn] be a polynomial of
degree at most d and ǫ > 0 be a given constant. If g 6≡ 0, then
Proba1∈U,··· ,an∈U [g(a1, a2, · · · , an) = 0] ≤
nd
p
(1 +
ǫ
2
),
where U = {ce | 0 ≤ c ≤M} and M > 2m+1/ǫ.
Proof. Consider the following tower of ideals inside R :
R ⊇ pR ⊇ p2R ⊇ · · · ⊇ pαR = {0}.
Let k be the integer such that g ∈ pkR[x1, · · · , xn] \ pk+1R[x1, · · · , xn]. Write g = pkgˆ. Consider
the ring, Iˆ = {r ∈ R | pkr = 0}. Clearly, Iˆ is an ideal of R. Let S = R/(Iˆ + pR). We claim
that gˆ is a nonzero polynomial in S[x1, · · · , xn]. Otherwise, let gˆ ∈ (Iˆ + pR)[x1, · · · , xn]. Write gˆ =
g1 + g2, where g1 ∈ Iˆ[x1, · · · , xn] and g2 ∈ pR[x1, · · · , xn]. Then pkgˆ = pkg2 as pkg1 = 0. But
g2 ∈ pR[x1, · · · , xn], which contradicts the fact that k is the largest integer such that g ∈ pkR[x1, · · · , xn].
Thus gˆ is a nonzero polynomial in S[x1, · · · , xn]. Now we argue that S contains the finite field Fp, and then
using the Lemma 5.3, the proof of the lemma will follow easily. To see a copy of Fp inside S, it is enough
to observe that {i+ (Iˆ + pR) | 0 ≤ i ≤ p− 1} as a field is isomorphic to Fp. Clearly the failure probability
for identity testing of g in R[x1, · · · , xn] is upper bounded by the failure probability for the identity testing
of gˆ in S[x1, · · · , xn]. Consider the natural homomorphism φ : U → Fp, given by φ(ce) = c mod p. Thus
if we sample uniformly from U , using φ, we can ǫ2 -uniformly sample from Fp. Notice that for any b ∈ Fp,
1−ǫ/2
p ≤ Probx∈ZM [x ≡ b mod p] ≤
1+ǫ/2
p . Now using the Lemma 5.3, we conclude the following :
Proba1∈U,a2∈U ···an∈U [g(a1, · · · , an) = 0] ≤ Probb1∈Fp···bn∈Fp [gˆ(b1, · · · , bn) = 0] ≤
nd
p
(1 +
ǫ
2
),
where bi = ai (mod p). The additional factor of (1 + ǫ2) comes from the fact that we are only sampling
ǫ
2 -uniformly from Fp. This can be easily verified from the proof of Lemma 5.3. Hence we have proved the
lemma.
6 Randomized Polynomial Identity Testing over finite rings
In this section we study the identity testing problem over finite commutative ring oracle with unity. For the
input polynomial, we consider both black-box representation and circuit representation. First we consider
the black-box case. Our identity testing algorithm is a direct consequence of Lemma 5.4.
Theorem 6.1 Let R (which decomposes into local rings as ⊕ℓi=1Ri) be a finite commutative ring with unity
given as a oracle. Let the input polynomial f ∈ R[x1, · · · , xn] of degree at most d be given via black-box
access. Suppose Ri’s is of characteristic pαii . Let ǫ > 0 be a given constant. If pi ≥ knd for all i, for some
integer k ≥ 2, we have a randomized polynomial time identity test with success probability 1− 1k (1 +
ǫ
2).
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Proof. Consider the natural isomorphism φˆ : R[x1, x2, · · · , xn] → ⊕ℓi=1Ri[x1, x2, · · · , xn]. Let φˆ(f) =
(f1, f2, · · · , fℓ). If f 6≡ 0 then fi 6≡ 0 for some i ∈ [ℓ], where fi ∈ Ri[x1, x2, · · · , xn]. Fix such an i. Our
algorithm is a direct application of Lemma 5.4. Define U = {ce | 0 ≤ c ≤ M}, assign values for the xi’s
independently and uniformly at random from U , and evaluate f using the black-box access. The algorithm
declares f 6≡ 0 if and only if the computed value is nonzero. By Lemma 5.4, our algorithm outputs the
correct answer with probability 1− ndpi (1 +
ǫ
2) ≥ 1−
1
k (1 +
ǫ
2).
1
The drawback of Theorem 6.1 is that we get a randomized polynomial-time algorithm only when pi ≥
knd.
However, when the polynomial f is given by an arithmetic circuit we will get a randomized identity test
that works for all finite commutative rings given by oracle. This is the main result in this section. A key
idea is to apply the transformation from [AB03] to convert the given multivariate polynomial to a univariate
polynomial. The following lemma has an identical proof as [AB03, Lemma 4.5].
Lemma 6.2 Let R be an arbitrary commutative ring and f ∈ R[x1, x2, · · · , xn] be any polynomial of
maximum degree d. Consider the polynomial g(x) obtained from f(x1, x2, · · · , xn) by replacing xi by
x(d+1)
i−1 i.e g(x) = f(x, x(d+1), · · · , x(d+1)n−1). Then f ≡ 0 over R[x1, · · · , xn] if and only if g ≡ 0 over
R[x].
By Lemma 6.2, it suffices to describe the identity test for a univariate polynomial in R[x] given by an
arithmetic circuit. Notice that if deg(f) = d then we can bound deg(g) by d(d + 1)n−1 which we denote
by D. Our algorithm is simple and essentially the same as the Agrawal-Biswas identity test over the finite
ring Zn [AB03].
We will randomly pick a monic polynomial q(x) ∈ U [x] of degree ⌈logO(D)⌉. Then we carry out a
division of f(x) by the polynomial q(x) and compute the remainder r(x) ∈ R[x]. Our algorithm declares
f to be identically zero if and only if r(x) = 0. Notice that we will use the structure of the circuit to carry
out the division. At each gate we carry out the division. More precisely, if the inputs of a + gate are the
remainders r1(x) and r2(x), then the output of this + gate is r1+ r2. Similarly if r1 and r2 are the inputs of
a ∗ gate, then we divide r1(x)r2(x) by q(x) and obtain the remainder as its output. Crucially, since q(x) is
a monic polynomial, the division algorithm will make sense and produce unique remainder even if R[x] is
not a U.F.D (which is the case in general).
We now describe the pseudocode of the identity testing algorithm (Algorithm 2). Our algorithm takes
as input an arithmetic circuit C computing a polynomial f ∈ R[x1, x2, · · · , xn] of degree at most d and an
ǫ > 0.
We will now prove the correctness of the above randomized identity test in Lemmas 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5.
Lemma 6.3 Let R be a local commutative ring with unity and of characteristic pα for some prime p and
integer α > 0. Let g be a nonzero polynomial in R[x] such that g ∈ pkR[x] \ pk+1R[x] for k < α. Let
Iˆ = {r ∈ R | pkr = 0}, g = pkgˆ where gˆ 6∈ pR and q is a monic polynomial in R[x]. If q divides g in R,
then q divides gˆ in R/(Iˆ + pR).
Proof. As q(x) divides g(x) in R[x], we have g(x) = q(x)q1(x) for some polynomial q1(x) ∈ R[x].
Suppose gˆ(x) = q(x)q¯(x)+r(x) in R[x] where the degree of r(x) is less than the degree of q(x). Also note
1Notice that we have to compute ce using the ring oracle for addition in R. Starting with e, we need to add it c times. The
running time for this computation can be made polynomial in log c by writing c in binary and applying the standard doubling
algorithm.
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Algorithm 2 The Identity Testing algorithm
1: procedure IdentityTesting(C ,ǫ)
2: for i = 1, n do
3: xi ← x(d+1)
i−1
⊲ Univariate transformation
4: end for
5: g(x)← C(x, x(d+1), · · · , x(d+1)
n−1
).
6: D ← d(d+ 1)n−1. ⊲ The formal degree of g(x) is at most D
7: Choose a monic polynomial q(x) ∈ U [x] of degree ⌈log 12D1−ǫ ⌉ uniformly at random.
8: Divide g(x) by q(x) and compute the remainder r(x). ⊲ The division algorithm uses the structure
of the circuit.
9: if r(x) = 0 then
10: C computes a zero polynomial.
11: else
12: C computes a nonzero polynomial.
13: end if
14: end procedure
that the division makes sense even over the ring as q(x) is monic. We want to show that r(x) ∈ (Iˆ+pR)[x].
We have the following relation in R[x]:
g = qq1 = p
kgˆ = pkqq¯ + pkr.
So, pkr = q(q1 − pk q¯). If (q1 − pkq¯) 6≡ 0 in R[x], then the degree of the polynomial q(q1 − pk q¯)
is strictly more than the degree of pkr as q is monic and degree of q is more than the degree of r. Thus
(qq1 − p
kqq¯) ≡ 0 in R[x] forcing pkr = 0 in R[x]. So by the choice of Iˆ , we have r(x) ∈ Iˆ[x]. Thus
r(x) ∈ (Iˆ + pR)[x]. Notice that in the Lemma 5.4, we have already proved that gˆ(x) 6≡ 0 in S[x], where
S = R/(Iˆ + pR). Also q is nonzero in S[x] as it is a monic polynomial. Hence we have proved that q(x)
divides gˆ(x) over S[x].
The following lemma is basically chinese remaindering tailored to our setting.
Lemma 6.4 Let R be a local ring with characteristic pα. Let g(x) ∈ pkR[x] \ pk+1R[x] for some k ≥ 0.
Let g(x) = pkgˆ(x) and Iˆ = {r ∈ R | pkr = 0}. Suppose q1(x), q2(x) are two monic polynomials over
R[x] such that each of them divides g in R[x]. Moreover, suppose there exist polynomials a(x), b(x) ∈ R[x]
such that aq1 + bq2 = 1 in R/(Iˆ + pR). Then q1q2 divides gˆ in R/(Iˆ + pR).
Proof. By the Lemma 6.3, we know that q1 and q2 divide gˆ in R/(Iˆ + pR). Let gˆ = q1q¯1 and gˆ = q2q¯2
in R/(Iˆ + pR). Let q¯1 = q2q3 + r in R/(Iˆ + pR). So, gˆ = q1q2q3 + q1r. Substituting q2q¯2 for gˆ,
we get q2(q¯2 − q1q3) = q1r. Multiplying both side by a and substituting aq1(x) = 1 − bq2, we get
q2[a(q¯2 − q1q3) + br] = r. If r 6≡ 0 in R/(Iˆ + pR), we arrive at a contradiction since q2 is monic and thus
the degree of q2[a(q¯2 − q1q3) + br] is more than the degree of r.
Let f(x) be a nonzero polynomial in R[x] of degree at most D. The next lemma states that, if we pick
a random monic polynomial q(x) ∈ U [x] (U is similarly defined as before)of degree d ≈ logO(D), with
high probability, q(x) will not divide f(x).
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Lemma 6.5 Let R be a commutative ring with unity. Suppose f(x) ∈ R[x] is a nonzero polynomial of
degree at most D and ǫ > 0 be a given constant. Choose a random monic polynomial q(x) of degree
d = ⌈log 12D1−ǫ ⌉ in U [x]. Then with probability at least
1−ǫ
4d , q(x) will not divide f(x) over R[x].
2
Proof. Let R ∼= ⊕iRi is the local ring decomposition of R. As f is nonzero in R[x], there exists j such
that fj = φˆj(f) is nonzero in Rj[x]. Clearly, we can lower bound the required probability by the probability
that qj = φˆj(q) does not divide fj in Rj [x]. Let the characteristic of Rj is pα. If qj divides fj in Rj [x],
then it also divides over Rj/(Iˆj + pRj). It is shown in the proof of the Lemma 5.4, Fp ⊂ Rj/(Iˆj + pRj).
Now the number of irreducible polynomials in Fp of degree d is at least p
d−2pd/2
d . Let t =
pd−2pd/2
d . Let
qˆ(x) =
∑d−1
i=0 bix
i + xd ∈ Fp[x] be a monic polynomial. Now if a monic polynomial P (x) of degree d is
randomly chosen from U [x] then, Prob[P (x) ≡ qˆ(x) mod p] =
Qd−1
i=0 ⌊(M−bi)/p⌋+1
Md
≥ 1
pd
(1 − 2
m
M )
d
. Again,
choosing M > d2m+1/ǫ, we get Prob[P (x) ≡ qˆ(x) mod p] ≥ (1− ǫ/2)/pd.
So, the probability that qj is an irreducible polynomial in Fp[x] is at least t(1 − ǫ)/pd > (1 − ǫ)/2d.
Let fj ∈ pkRj [x] \ pk+1Rj[x]. So we can write fj = pkf ′, where f ′ ∈ Rj[x] \ pRj[x]. By the Lemma 6.3,
qj divides f ′ in R/(Iˆj + pR). Also, by the Lemma 6.4, the number of different monic polynomials that are
irreducible in Fp and divides f ′ in Rj/(Iˆj + pRj) is at most D/d. In the sample space for q, any monic
polynomial of degree d in Rj/(Iˆj + pRj) occurs at most (Mp + 1)
d times. So the probability that a random
monic irreducible polynomial q will divide f is at most
(D/d)(M
p
+1)d
Md
≤ D
dpd
(1 + 1d )
d < 3D
d2d
. So a random
monic polynomial q ∈ U [x] (which is irreducible in Fp with reasonable probability) will not divide f(x)
with probability at least 1−ǫ2d −
3D
dpd
> 1−ǫ4d for d ≥ ⌈log
12D
1−ǫ ⌉.
The correctness of Algorithm 2 and its success probability follow directly from Lemma 6.3, Lemma 6.4
and Lemma 6.5.
In particular, by Lemma 6.5, the success probability of our algorithm is at least 1−ǫ4t , where t =
⌈log 12D1−ǫ ⌉. As
1−ǫ
4t is an inverse polynomial quantity in input size and the randomized algorithm has one-
sided error, we can boost the success probability by repeating the test polynomially many times. We sum-
marize the result in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.6 Let R be a finite commutative ring with unity given as an oracle and f ∈ R[x] be a polyno-
mial, given as an arithmetic circuit. Then in randomized time polynomial in the circuit size and log |R| we
can test whether f ≡ 0 in R[x].
Randomized polynomial time identity testing for multivariate polynomials f ∈ R[x1, · · · , xn] given by
arithmetic circuits follows from Theorem 6.6 and Lemma 6.2.
Theorem 6.7 Let R be a commutative ring with unity given as an oracle. Let f be a polynomial in
R[x1, x2, · · · , xn] of formal degree at most d, is given by an arithmetic circuit over R. Then in randomized
time polynomial in circuit size and log |R| we can test whether f ≡ 0 in R[x1, x2, · · · , xn].
Remark 6.8 The randomized polynomial-time identity test of Bogdanov and Wee [BW05] for noncommuta-
tive circuits of polynomially bounded degree in F{x1, · · · , xn} for a field F, can be extended to such circuits
over any commutative ring R with unity, where R is given by a ring oracle. This follows from the fact that
the Amitsur-Levitzki theorem is easily seen to hold even in the ring R{x1, · · · , xn}. The easy details are
given in the appendix.
2An alternative proof of this lemma based on [AB03, Lemma 4.7] is given in the appendix.
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Remark 6.9 Finally, we note that the results in Section 2 carry over without changes to noncommuting
polynomials in R{x1, · · · , xn}, where R is a commutative ring with unity given by a ring oracle.
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A Noncommutative identity testing over commutative coefficient rings
Here we extend the noncommutative identity testing of Bogdanov and Wee [BW05] to over R{x1, · · · , xn}
where R is an arbitrary commutative ring with unity. Our algorithm is a combination of Amitsur-Levitzki’s
theorem and the Theorem 6.7. We first briefly discuss the Amitsur-Levitzki’s result tailored to our appli-
cation and the result of [BW05]. Let Mk(F) be the k × k matrix algebra over F. The following algebraic
lemma was the key result used in [BW05].
Lemma A.1 [AL50, GZ05] Mk(F) does not satisfy any non-trivial polynomial identity of degree < 2k.
Based on Lemma A.1, a noncommutative version of the Schwartz-Zippel lemma over F{x1, · · · , xn}
is described in [BW05]. We first give an intuitive description of the identity testing algorithm in [BW05].
Assume f ∈ F{x1, · · · , xn} is of degree d and is given by an arithmetic circuit. Fix k such that k > ⌈d/2⌉.
Consider a field extension F′ of F such that |F′| >> d. The idea is to evaluate the circuit on random k × k
matrices from Mk(F′). We think each entry of the matrix as an indeterminate and view the k2 indeterminates
as commuting variables. So at the output of the circuit, we get a k × k matrix such that each of its entries
are polynomials in commuting variables. Lemma A.1 guarantees that f ≡ 0 in F{x1, · · · , xn} if and only
if each of the k2 polynomials computed as the entries of the matrix at the output gate, are identically zero.
Then we get a lower bound of the success probability via commutative Schwartz-Zippel lemma.
We give a randomized polynomial time identity testing algorithm over R{x1, · · · , xn} where R is any
finite commutative ring with unity and is given by a ring oracle. Our algorithm is based on the observation
that Lemma A.1 is valid over Mk(R). For the sake of completeness, we briefly discuss the proof of the
Lemma A.1 tailored to R. The following fact is the key in proving the Lemma A.1.
Fact A.2 [GZ05, page 7] Let A be an F-algebra spanned by a set B over F. If the algebra A satisfies an
identity of degree k in F{x1, · · · , xn}, then it satisfies a multilinear identity of degree ≤ k.
We observe that the result of the Fact A.2 holds, even if A be an algebra over R. Proof is analogous to
the proof of the Fact A.2. Following [GZ05, page 7], we call a polynomial f multilinear if every variable
occurs with degree exactly one in every monomial of f .
Lemma A.3 Let A be an R-algebra such that A satisfies an identity of degree k. Then it satisfies a multi-
linear identity of degree k.
Proof. The lemma follows from an identical argument to that in the proof of Theorem 1.3.7 in [GZ05].
Using Lemma A.3, it follows that Lemma A.1 extends to Mk(R). The proof is analogous to the proof
of Theorem 1.7.2 in [GZ05]. Let f be an identity for Mk(R) of degree < 2k. By the Lemma A.3, we can
assume that f is multilinear. Also, multiplying f by the new variables from the right, we can assume that
the degree of f is 2k − 1. Let,
f(x1, x2, · · · , x2k−1) =
∑
σ∈S2k−1
ασxσ(1) · · · xσ(2k−1)
with α1 6= 0, where 1 denotes the identity permutation. Let eij be the k × k matrix with unity (of R) at
the (i, j)-th entry and zero in all other entries. It is easy to see that f(e11, e12, e22, e23, · · · , ek−1,k, ekk) =
α1e1k 6= 0, since x1 · · · x2k−1 is the only monomial that does not vanish during the evaluation. So f is not
an identity for Mk(R). The fact that R is a ring with unity is crucially used.
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Lemma A.4 Let R be a finite commutative ring with unity. Then Mk(R) does not satisfy any polynomial
identity of degree < 2k.
Now we a randomized polynomial time identity testing algorithm over R{x1, · · · , xn}.
Theorem A.5 Let f ∈ R{x1, · · · , xn} be a polynomial of degree d, given by a noncommutative arithmetic
circuit C . R is given as a ring oracle and its elements are encoded using binary strings of length m. Then
there is a randomized polynomial time algorithm (poly(n,d,m)) to test if f ≡ 0 over R{x1, · · · , xn}.
Proof. Let x1, x2, · · · , xn are the indeterminates in C . Choose k = ⌈d/2⌉ + 1. Replace each xi by a
k × k matrix over the set of indeterminates {y(i)jℓ }1≤j,ℓ≤k. Once we replace xi by matrices , the inputs and
the outputs of the gates will be matrices. Replace each addition (multiplication) gate by a block of circuits
computing the sum (product) of two k × k matrices (without loss of generality, assume that the fan-in of
all gates is two). This can be easily achieved using O(k2) gates. Let Cˆ be the arithmetic circuit obtained
from C by these modifications. Clearly, Cˆ computes a function from Fnk2 → Fk2 and the size of Cˆ is only
polynomial in the size of C . Denote by Y¯ the variable list (y(1)11 , · · · , y
(1)
kk , · · · , y
(n)
11 , · · · , y
(n)
kk ). Then,
Cˆ(Y¯ ) = (P1(Y¯ ), · · · , Pk2(Y¯ )).
Also, by the Lemma A.4, Mk(R) does not satisfy any identity of degree < 2k over R{x1, · · · , xn}. So f
satisfies Mk(R) if and only if f ≡ 0 in R{x1, · · · , xn}, which equivalently implies that Pi ≡ 0 over R[Y¯ ]
for all i. Notice that the degree of Pi is ≤ d. Now we appeal to the Theorem 6.7 in order to test whether
Pi ≡ 0 in time poly(n, d,m).
Bogdanov and Wee in [BW05] evaluate the noncommutative circuit over a field extension F′ of F in
case F is a small field compared to the degree. In our proof of Theorem A.5, when coefficients come from
the ring R, we avoid working in a ring extension and instead apply Theorem 6.7.
B Alternative proof of Lemma 6.5
Let R be a finite commutative ring with unity (denoted e) and its elements uniformly encoded in {0, 1}m.
Recall we need to show the following: if we divide a nonzero polynomial g(x) ∈ R[x] of degree D by
a random monic polynomial q(x) ∈ U [x] of degree logO(D) then with high probability we get a nonzero
remainder. Recall from Section 6 that U = {ke | 0 ≤ k ≤M − 1}, where M > 2m+1/ǫ.
Indeed, Agrawal and Biswas essentially show in [AB03, Lemma 4.7] that the above result holds for the
special case when the ring R is the ring Zt of integers modulo t, where t is any positive integer given in
binary. In Section 6 we gave a self-contained proof of Lemma 6.5. In the sequel we give a different proof
which applies the [AB03] result for Zt and brings out an interesting property of the division algorithm.
Let n denote the characteristic of the ring R. Then sampling from U [x] amounts to almost uniform
sampling from the copy of Zn[x], namely Zne[x], contained in R[x] as a subring. Since (R,+) is a finite
abelian group, by the fundamental theorem for abelian groups, we can write (R,+) as a direct sum R =⊕k
i=1 Zniei, where e1, · · · , ek forms an independent generating set for (R,+), and ni is the additive order
of ei for each i. Notice that the lcm of n1, · · · , nk is the ring’s characteristic n. This decomposition extends
naturally to the additive group (R[x],+) to give
R[x] =
k⊕
i=1
Zni [x]ei. (2)
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Thus, every polynomial g(x) ∈ R[x] can be uniquely written as g(x) =
∑
i=1 gi(x)ei, where gi is a
polynomial with integer coefficients in the range 0, · · · , ni − 1 for each i. Clearly, dividing g(x) by q(x)
amounts to dividing each term in
∑
i=1 gi(x)ei. The following claim tells us how to analyze this term by
term division. More precisely, we analyze the quotient and remainder when we divide gi(x)ei ∈ R[x] by
q(x) ∈ Zn[x] (∼= Zne[x] ⊆ R[x]).
Claim B.1 Let gi(x) = q(x)q′(x) + r′(x) be the quotient and remainder when we divide gi(x) by q(x) in
the ring Zni [x]. Let gi(x)ei = q(x)q′′(x) + r′′(x) be the quotient and remainder when we divide gi(x)ei by
q(x) in the ring R[x]. Then q′(x)ei = q′′(x) and r′(x)ei = r′′(x).
This claim is somewhat surprising because Equation 2 only gives us a group decomposition of R[x] and not
a ring decomposition. Thus, it is not clear why division in the ring Zni [x] can be related to division in R[x].
Indeed, the crucial reason why we can relate the two divisions is because the divisor polynomial q(x) lives
in the copy of Zn[x] inside R[x].
To see the claim, we will carry out the division of gi(x) by q(x) over R[x]. Since both gi and q(x) have
integer coefficients, this amounts to carrying out division in Zn[x] which yields, say, gi(x) = q(x)q1(x) +
r1(x). We can also write q1(x) = a(x)+nib(x) and r1(x) = c(x)+nid(x). Then, over Zni , notice that we
must have gi(x) = q(x)a(x)+c(x). Therefore, a(x) = q′(x) and c(x) = r′(x). Now, multiplying both sides
by ei we will get q1(x)ei = a(x)ei + nieib(x) = a(x)ei = q′(x)ei. Similarly, we get r1(x)ei = c(x)ei =
r′(x)ei. Furthermore, again multiplying both sides by ei, we also get gi(x)ei = q(x)q1(x)ei + r1(x)ei.
Hence, q′′(x) = q1(x)ei = q′(x)ei and r′′(x) = r1(x)ei = r′(x)ei. This proves the claim.
A consequence of the claim is the following nice property of the division algorithm: in order to divide
g(x) by q(x) over the ring R, for each i we can carry out the division of gi(x) by q(x) over the ring Zni and
obtain the quotients and remainders:
gi(x) = q(x)q
′
i(x) + r
′
i(x).
Then we can put together the term by term divisions to obtain
g(x) = q(x)(
k∑
i=1
q′i(x)ei) + (
k∑
i=1
r′i(x)ei). (3)
More precisely, when we divide g(x) by q(x) in R[x], the quotient is
∑k
i=1 q
′
i(x)ei and the remainder is∑k
i=1 r
′
i(x)ei. Now, since g ∈ R[x] is nonzero, there is an index j such that gj [x] ∈ Znj [x] is nonzero.
Furthermore, since nj is a factor of n, the polynomial q(x) modulo nj is still an almost uniformly distributed
random monic polynomial. It follows from the Agrawal-Biswas result [AB03, Lemma 4.7] applied to
division of gj(x) by q(x) over Znj that r′j(x) will be nonzero with high probability. Consequently, by
Equation 3 the remainder
∑k
i=1 r
′
i(x)ei on dividing g(x) by q(x) in the ring R[x] is also nonzero with the
same probability.
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